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Abstract 
Whilst there is evidence linking informational cue processing ability to effective 
decision making on the fireground, only a few studies have actually attempted 
detailed description and categorization of the cues sought by fireground 
commanders when managing real fires. In this study, thirty experienced 
firefighters were interviewed across various fire stations in the UK and Nigeria 
using the critical decision method protocol. Forty one different cues were 
identified, which were then categorized into five distinct types namely: safety 
cues, cues that indicate the nature of problem, environmental cues, emotive 
cues, and incident command and control cues. The paper concludes by 
evaluating the role of expertise in cue utilization, drawing on evidence from the 
naturalistic decision making (NDM) literature.        
 
1.0. INTRODUCTION   
What does a thick black smoke forcing itself out of the eaves of a roof tell an expert 
firefighter? What does a cracked wall in a well-alight building signify? What 
immediately comes to the mind of an incident commander after sighting a large 
panicking crowd gathered at the scene of an incident? Whilst the possible answers to 
the above prompts (cues) and their implications for task performance (action) may 
seem straightforward for experienced commanders, the same may not be the case for 
novices. Although recognizing a range of task related cues is expected to be a routine 
task for novices considering they have been trained to do this, prior evidence suggests 
that novices sometimes struggle to interpret the implications of subtle cues under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty and time-pressure. Existing studies have shown that 
simply identifying cues seem insufficient for managing complex incidents (Weick, 
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1993; Baylor, 2001; Dreyfus, 2004; Klein et al., 2006; Lipshitz et al., 2007), operators 
must also be able to make sense of what each cue implies, and subsequently use their 
cue discrimination skills to develop workable action plans. Experts are generally able 
to recall the cues that aid task performance better than novices, and this has been 
attributed to the extensive domain knowledge they possess and to the efficient 
functioning of their schemas (Sweller, 1994; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; Cowan, 
2008; Clark, 2014; Okoli et al., 2014). Schemas contain rules and procedures that can 
systematically link particular features of a problem to its possible course of action (IF 
condition, THEN action). In other words, experts often strive to use the general 
knowledge they have about a domain, or the knowledge they are able to recall from 
concrete cases, or both, to form action plans and solve new problems (Ten Berge and 
Van Hezewijk, 1999; Tulving, 2002; Klein, 2003; Feldon, 2007)  
What then is a cue? Wong (2000) defined it as any stimulus with implications for action; 
a feature of the task environment, which through the aid of knowledge and experience 
has been associated in memory with particular events (Okoli et al., 2016a). Over the 
years, research on cue-based performance has gained more attention as scholars 
continue to explore the critical cues upon which experts base their judgment. In both 
judgment and decision making (JDM) and naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
literatures, scholars have proposed possible ways through which cue-based learning 
could be improved for training purposes (Crandall and Getchell-Reiter 1993; Spence 
and Brucks, 1997; O’Hare et al., 1998; Wong, 2000; Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003; Perry 
and Wiggins, 2008; Klein, 2008; Okoli et al., 2013; Lamb et al., 2014). Specifically, 
some of the studies in JDM literature have utilized a cue-based learning approach 
known as multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) to explain how decision-makers 
make sense of information accruing from task related cues (Castellan, 1973; 
Steinmann, 1976; Juslin et al., 2003; Newell, Lagnado and Shanks, 2007). MCPL at 
its most basic form is a predictive mode of learning that attempts to predict an outcome 
on the basis of cue weightings in situations where the relation between the outcome 
and the cues is probabilistic (Newell et al., 2009). Scholars have examined some of 
the key conceptual differences between both paradigms, with split opinions regarding 
their level of competitiveness and/or complementarity (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; 
Okoli et al., 2014). Essentially, MCPL approach contains mostly studies conducted 
within laboratory settings where subjects are required to perform ‘trivial’ tasks, while 
NDM approach, on the other hand, comprises studies predominantly carried out in 
naturalistic (field) settings which are characterized by uncertainty, volatility and 
complexity.  
The current study is hinged on the NDM paradigm where scholars are concerned with 
understanding how experts make difficult task-related decisions using their 
experience. Within the NDM community, a range of cue-related studies have emerged 
(See Hoffman et al., 1998; Barton and Sutcliffe, 2009 for review). For instance, 
Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) studied 22 experienced nurses in a neonatal 
intensive care unit (Mean years of experience = 13) and found that expert nurses could 
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detect infants with potential life-threatening infections even before carrying out blood 
tests to verify. The authors eventually identified a range of cues that aided the expert 
nurses’ decision-making, some of which had not appeared in the nursing literature at 
the time. Also, in their study involving urban firefighters Klein and his colleagues 
showed that expert firefighters could make quick and accurate decisions under time 
pressure by matching cues in the task environment against existing prototypes in their 
memory (Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). This insight subsequently led 
to the development of a decision-making model which the authors termed the 
recognition primed decision making model (Klein, 2008). The work of Biederman and 
Shiffrar (1987) further recorded how qualified geneticists could rely on some tacit cues 
to find out the gender of about 1,000 newly hatched chickens within one hour, with 
98% rate of accuracy. In another naturalistic study, Barton and Sutcliffe (2009) were 
interested in understanding why Wildland operational commanders might have to 
continue (or discontinue) to follow an action plan (e.g. sticking to direct firefighting or 
switching to a defensive approach). The authors noted that failure to identify the cues 
that signal the need for change was often not the problem, but that incidents escalate 
out of control mainly because officers get so engrossed in an evolving situation that 
they fail to pause and incorporate these cues into a new understanding of that 
situation. The authors used the term ‘dysfunctional momentum’ to describe a situation 
where individuals or teams choose to proceed with a course of failing action [italics in 
original] despite warning cues suggesting an alternative action.   
However, despite attempts made by prior research to show how cue identification (or 
the lack of it) affects task performance, only a limited number of studies have provided 
detailed categorization of the various cues used by domain experts, particularly in the 
firefighting domain. To bridge this knowledge gap, the current study employed the 
critical decision method as knowledge elicitation tool to elicit the various cues which 
experts utilized in managing complex and high-staked fire incidents. The identified 
cues were thereafter categorized on the basis of the type of information each cue 
generated to the officers. The categorization of cues attempted in this paper is 
conceived as a recipe for knowledge management and organizational learning, 
particularly in this era where the occurrence of non-routine fire incidents has been on 
the decline (Lamb et al., 2014). Since novices now have fewer windows of opportunity 
to gain real-life (operational) experience, the developed critical cue inventory is hoped 
to play a significant role in the design of training curricula that is more representative 
of real-life tasks. The overall intention was to find more productive ways through which 
cue-based knowledge sharing could be enhanced ─ in this case leveraging on what 
experts know and do on the fireground.  
We therefore purport that identifying the exact cues used by experts on the fireground, 
understanding how they influence fireground decisions and examining how experts 
discriminate between the various cue classes are a good starting point in the design 
of an effective cue-based learning protocol. The paper concluded by discussing the 
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role of expertise in the identification and interpretation of task related cues, drawing 
on insights from the naturalistic decision making (NDM) literature.  
For the purpose of clarity, the current study focuses on non-routine fire incidents. 
Although we acknowledged that firefighters are involved in a number of task related 
activities such as well (water) rescue, road and rail traffic collision, chemical 
decontamination and rescue services, the cues generated in this study emerged 
mainly from fire incidents that considerably challenged officers’ expertise. These 
incidents include: massive house fires; mechanic workshop and warehouse fires 
involving combustible substances such as acetylene and LPG cylinders; petrol storage 
fires; serious fires within task constraining locations e.g. in areas where access to the 
seat of fire seems problematic; arson cases and road traffic accidents involving fire 
explosions.   
2.0. METHOD 
When making critical decisions in most emergency response organizations the cues 
used by experts mostly lie in the unconscious realm, which they act upon tacitly. Hence 
eliciting useful information about such cues would often require the application of 
formal knowledge elicitation tools. As discussed below, we utilized one of such tools 
in this study ─ the critical decision method.    
2.1. Critical decision method (CDM) 
With the emergence of expert systems and the growing interest in naturalistic/real 
world decision making, researchers have in more recent years become interested in 
eliciting the basis of expert knowledge. This has increased the number of knowledge 
elicitation tools currently available in the fields of knowledge management and 
cognitive psychology (see for example, Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989; 
Hoffman et al., 1995). The critical decision method was employed in this study, which 
is “a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to actual 
non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision making” (Klein et al., 
1989, p.464). CDM was preferred to other methods within the cognitive task analysis 
family (see Hoffman et al., 1998) because of its proficiency in capturing the cognitive 
strategies of decision-makers through in-depth cognitive probing (see data collection 
method below).    
 2.2. Selection of participants 
The sample size for the current study is comprised of 30 experienced firefighters 
(N=15, UK and N=15, Nigeria), with officers selected from major fire stations across 
the two study areas. The authors chose UK and Nigeria as study areas ─ initially for 
the purpose of comparison, but also to identify common themes or similarities that 
might exist between the two groups in the area of cue-based decision making. 
However, we wish to clarify that the intention of the current paper is not to discuss 
cross-cultural differences between both groups of experts, but to report the type of 
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cues identified and utilized by each officer on the fireground. We have elsewhere 
shown that a significant level of similarity exists between both groups of experts on the 
basis of the type of cues sought and utilized on the fireground (Okoli et al, 2016a; Okoli 
et al., 2016b). For example, environmental cues such as wind velocity, wind direction 
and external temperature, and fire-related cues such as smoke colour, size of fire and 
flame texture were not only found to convey similar meaning to officers but also 
affected response effort alike, regardless of location. Building on these insights we first 
aggregated all the cues common to both groups of experts and then categorized them.   
Certain criteria were considered in the study in order to ensure the right set of 
participants were recruited. Firstly, participants were carefully selected on the basis of 
their rank/position. This was to ensure that the selected officers are verifiably real 
experts. Secondly, all participants must have been personally involved in managing 
real-life fire incidents for which they made independent decisions with little or no 
supervision from their superiors. This implies that potential participants must have at 
least operated as operational commanders i.e. officers who take responsibility and 
leadership of managing one or more fire engines at the scene of an incident.  
Participants were also recruited through peer nomination ─ this process of 'peer 
nomination' is also known as 'Snowballing' where the researcher asks a key informant 
if they can recommend another potential participant whom the researcher might wish 
to contact for interview. The chain went on and on until the required sample size was 
reached. This was the case both in the UK and Nigeria, and participants were willing 
to suggest other officers whom they felt met the study criteria.  
2.3. Data collection and Analysis 
The study employed the full CDM procedure (see Klein et al., 1989; Hoffman et al., 
1995; Hoffman et al., 1998). Participants were first asked to recall and narrate a 
memorable fire incident, regardless of when the incident occurred — with emphasis 
on incidents that particularly challenged their expertise. It was important to limit the 
choice of incidents to non-routine incidents as managing such incidents has been 
shown to invoke greater use of tacit knowledge compared to routine incidents 
(Wipawayangkool and Teng, 2014). This explains why managing routine incidents is 
more likely to call for the skills of experienced officers.   
Participants narrated the incident they have chosen from start to finish, with minimal 
interference from the investigator. This was to ensure that a rich context of the incident 
was obtained, including a detailed account of the sequence of proceedings that 
occurred (for a detailed discussion on CDM procedure see Hoffman et al., 1998; 
O’Hare et al., 1998). After narrating the incident, a timeline was sketched by the 
interviewer and participants were asked to indicate points along the timeline where 
key actions took place i.e. points where important decisions were made (see Table 2 
for sample of decision points). A decision point, which is the unit of analysis in the 
study, was defined as any point in the timeline of an incident where participants 
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admitted following a particular course of action even though other options were 
potentially available. The incident timeline and decision point identification stages were 
followed by probing each decision point, using a set of cognitive probes to enhance 
the knowledge elicitation process (See Table 1). Although the cognitive probes shown 
in Table 1 covered a range of themes such as the cues sought by experts, the goals 
pursued at each decision point, the information utilized at each decision point, it is 
important to emphasize that the subject of cues appeared central across the entire 
probe questions. Nearly all decision points (sets of actions taken by the officers) were 
informed by certain cues, either from sources internal or external to the decision 
maker. Essentially, data used in the cues categorization process was not limited to a 
single probe question, rather insights were generated from the analysis conducted 
across the thirty incident reports. Data analysis focused specifically on the cues sought 
by experts, the cue sources and the type of information each of the experts generated 
from each decision point (see Table 3 for sample of coding process).  
For the purpose of quality appraisal, two reviewers who are co-authors of the current 
paper were involved in the coding and categorization process. Random samples of 
interview excerpts were provided to the reviewers for evaluation, after which the three 
authors converged to agree on the final coding frames.     
Table 1: Sample of CDM probe questions used in this study (Adapted from Hoffman et al., 
1998) 
Probe Type Probe Content 
Cues What were you seeing, hearing or smelling that helped in formulating 
your action plans? 
Knowledge What information did you use in making these decisions and how was it 
obtained? 
Analogues/Prototypes Were you reminded of any previous incident(s) while managing this 
particular incident 
Level of Novelty Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario? Does it fit a scenario 
you were trained to deal with? 
Goals What were your specific goals and objectives at each decision point? 
Options What other courses of action were considered or were available? Why 
were these options not considered? 
Rule based/Adaptive/ 
Creative decisions 
What rules were you following at each decision point? At what point did 
you go beyond following SOPs or firefighting rules? Were you being 
creative with any of your decisions?  
Most important 
information 
What was the single most important information that you used in 
formulating your action plans? 
Experience and  
prerequisite knowledge 
What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making 
these decisions? What training, knowledge, or information might have 
helped? 
Time pressure How much time pressure was involved in making each of these 
decisions? How long did it actually take you to make these decisions? 
Errors What mistakes are likely at each decision point? Did you acknowledge 
if your situation assessment or option selection were incorrect? How 
might a novice have behaved differently? 
Hypotheticals Briefly explain what you would do if you arrived at the scene of a serious 
fire and discovered that you have very little information about what was 
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Each interview lasted between 1hr-2.30hr. Notes were taken as the interview 
progressed and a diagrammatic representation of the timeline was sketched during 
the interview to enhance memory recall of the incidents.  A total of 134 decision points 
were obtained from the thirty interviews (see sample of decision points in Table 2) and 
CDM probes were applied to each decision point so as to gain a deeper understanding 
of the proceedings of events. For the purpose of this paper, the aim of analysis at each 
decision point was to better understand exactly what an expert firefighter was “seeing” 
“hearing” or “perceiving” that necessitated making certain decisions over other 
potentially available alternatives (See sample of excerpts and coding process in Table 
3). Capturing and categorizing these cues (as detailed in Table 4) were seen as a 
useful way through which knowledge about cues can be transferred from experts to 
novices. 
Table 2: sample of selected decision points from both UK and Nigerian firefighters 
Decision points Type of incident Location 
Requested specialist appliance (transition from 
water to foam attack) 
Petrol fire UK 
Called for more appliance from control room (asked 
for reinforcement from 2 to 7 fire engines) 
Garage Workshop fire UK 
Started delegating tasks to other personnel while 
still enroute the incident scene  
Office fire Nigeria 
Considered evacuation of the fire crews i.e. 
switched to a more defensive firefighting strategy 
School fire UK 
Demolished the entrance door in order to gain 
access to the seat of fire 
House fire Nigeria 
Spotted areas where walls have been weak and 
avoided direct firefighting around there  
House fire Nigeria 
Started firefighting operation from unaffected areas 
in the building. 
School fire Nigeria 
Made use of hosereel in extinguishing the fire 
instead of mainjet. 
House fire UK 
 Broke the glass leading to the building so as to 
gain access to the seat of fire. 
House fire Nigeria 
Withdrew the crews because the fire grew out of 
control  
School fire UK 
Immediately took charge of the incident without 
waiting for any formal handover 
Garage Workshop fire UK 
3.0. RESULTS 
Following each interview excerpt below are participants’ name, years of experience, 
rank, and incident location. To maintain anonymity and confidentiality of participants, 
it was important to change their real names to pseudonyms (false names), while other 
details remain unaltered.   
3.1. Critical cue inventory  
happening and yet have to make decisions whether to employ an 
offensive or a defensive attack? 
8 
 
We define the critical cue inventory (CCI) as a range of cues that have been collected 
and compiled from coded incident accounts for the purpose of developing instructional 
guidelines mainly for cue-based learning. A detailed qualitative classification of the 
elicited firefighting cues is discussed in turn below:  
 
 
Table 3: Sample of excerpts showing how cues were coded and abstracted into categories 
Interview excerpts Codes Sub-categories 
…because I could see the way that the smoke was 
behaving and the lack of flame and the colour of the 
smoke that confirmed to me that it was safe for 
firefighters to use the ladder to go in through the doors 
(Jade, 15, Crew Commander, UK) 
 Smoke  
 Lack of flame 
 Colour of smoke 
 Use of ladder 
 Visible cue (CINP)  
 Visible cue    
 Visible cue  
 Action  
Also because the sympathizers have been trying before 
our arrival, so far they have not been able to conquer 
the fire, it means that the fire is not easy (Sammy, 8, 
Crew commander, Nigeria) 
 Attempts by crowds 
 Difficult fire 
 Emotive cue (EC) 
 Implication of cue 
The first thing was the size of the fire and its intensity. 
The next was the potential for it to spread, the potential 
for widespread damage as a result of our actions. The 
obvious ones was what I could see; there was access 
to the seat of the fire which we didn’t see before (Patrick, 
32, Asst. Fire Chief)   
 Size of fire 
 Intensity of blaze  
 Potential of spread 
 Access to seat   
         of fire 
 Visible cue 
 Visible cue 
 Potential hazard 
(SC) 
 Insight 
The smoke/flame is also an important source of 
information. When the smoke is white/light then the fire 
is not dangerous. But when you see the smoke deep 
and dark, it means the fire is too dangerous” (Kevin, 8, 
Watch commander,  Nigeria) 
 Nature of smoke colour     
         and flame  
 Smoke colour 
 Discrimination of  
         smoke colour   
 Visible cue 
 
 Visible cue 
 Cue discrimination 
skill 
So we arrived find not only a fully developed fire that is 
burning quite well, but people from the balconies, on the 
windows all shouting and screaming for help (Lambert, 
26, Watch commander, UK) 
 Fire intensity 
 People screaming help 
 Visible cue 
 Emotive cue 
I had to look at the stability of the building because the 
window had come out which is a supporting structure in 
itself and that the floor actually dropped (Dake, 17, 
Watch commander, UK) 
 Stability of building 
 Collapse of window 
 Dropping of floor     
 
 Potential hazard (SC) 
 Potential hazard 
 Potential hazard 
We found that the petrol was already licking, moving 
towards residential areas….. The erosion has actually 
taken the fuel to a distance of about 2km, and we had 
to follow it like that, spraying chemicals along the line 
(Mike, 28, Asst. Chief fire supt, Nigeria)  
 Licking petrol 
 Direction of hazard 
 Use of chemicals 
 
 Potential hazard 
 Potential hazard 
 Action 
So my first decision was about when am I taking over. I 
know I have got a significant incident on my hands, I 
have to take over, I’m obliged to when it gets to 5 
pumps” (Darren, 17, District commander, UK) 
 Awareness of  
         take-over duty 
 Awareness of  
         take-over time 
        
  
 Situation 
Awareness 
 Command and 
             control (ICCC) 
The wind was like swirling, and the fire was actually 
drawing the wind in. So even on the opposite side of the 
fire you might have had a wind say 5, 6, 7 10 miles/hr, 
it’s probably 40-50miles/hr on the opposite side, in the 
area that I was in because it was being swirled around 
and the fire was actually drawing all the oxygen in to 
feed the fire. The trees were sort of blowing, it’s like a 
 Wind movement 
 Increase in fire 
         intensity  
 Environmental cue 
(EVC) 
 Implication of cue  
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full-scale. I have never experienced anything like it. 
(Dunham, 13.5, Station manager, UK) 
Note: CINP (cues that indicate the nature of problem); EC (Emotive cues); SC (Safety cues); 
EVC (Environmental cues) and ICCC (Incident command and control cues)   
   
3.2. Classification of cues 
 
As shown in Table 4, thematic analysis of the interview reports revealed 41 different 
cues experts sought under various task constraints. These cues were further 
categorized into five distinct types:  
(i) Safety cues:  As much as firefighters have an obligation to save lives and 
properties, they are required to do so within a reasonable boundary of safety. This 
implies that incident commanders would most times have to rely on safety related 
cues in order to determine the most appropriate options. Cues that belong to this 
category primarily influence officers’ risk taking behaviour and suggest if, for 
example, it is more appropriate to adopt a precautionary approach or whether it is 
best to initiate direct firefighting. Safety related cues therefore ensures that 
optimum balance is reached between taking reckless risks on one hand and being 
unnecessarily risk averse on the other hand. Examples of safety related cues 
include cracked walls in a well-alight building, signs of roof collapse, presence of 
combustible substances such as acetylene or LPG cylinders (see list on Table 4).  
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Table 4: Critical cue inventory from elicited expert knowledge 
Safety cues Cues that indicate the 
“Nature of Problem” 
 
Environmental Cues 
 
Emotive cues 
 
Cues that inform 
incident command 
and control decisions 
 
 Cracked wall  
 Falling wall  
 Roof condition (possibility of 
collapse) 
 Substances present/perceived 
to be present in a building e.g. 
combustible materials such as petrol, 
acetylene cylinders, LPG cylinders 
 Potential of fire spreading 
 Smoke behaviour (flashovers, 
backdrafts) 
 Location of the seat of fire 
 Location of unaffected 
properties  
 Type of building (terraced, 
block of flats, single-story, multi-
storied) 
 Entry point (accessible, 
obstructive) 
 Category of victims trapped 
(elderly, disabled, mentally 
challenged) 
 
 Size of Fire  
 Intensity of fire  
 Pattern of flame movement 
 Egress of the flames  
 Smoke colour (yellowish 
rainbow, blue, thick black) 
 Smell/odour of smoke and 
burning substances 
 Texture of smoke (thick, light, 
cloudy) 
 Severity of physical damage 
 The nature and extent of 
injury suffered by victims  
 Room temperature (A room 
on fire can sometimes be as hot as 
1000oC) 
 Type of materials burning or 
class of fire (metal fire, gas fire, 
batteries, acetylene) 
 Noise of vibration on the 
ground  
 The intensity of heat emitted 
from the blazing fire to the 
environment 
 The quantity of water that has 
been used up in the process (10,000 
litres show how serious a fire is) 
 
 
 
 Wind direction (is 
the wind blowing towards 
or away from the fire?) 
 Wind 
speed/intensity 
 External 
temperature/climatic 
condition (Hot, warm, 
harmattan, cold) 
 Catchment area 
(Residential, Factory, 
Industrial, Rural, City) 
 Location of 
incident (Rural or Urban 
area) 
 Distance to water 
supply (availability and 
proximity of hydrants) 
 Topography of the 
street e.g. steep slope, 
high slope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Verbal threat 
from victims  
 Shouts for 
“help” from crowd 
 Level of 
panic displayed by 
the crowd 
 Cry and 
wailings from 
trapped victims  
 The number 
of passers-by at the 
scene of incident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The rank/level of 
experience of the officer 
currently in charge 
 The number of 
pumps deployed (a more 
superior officer takes over 
when the number of on-
scene pumps gets to five 
 The size of the 
building (building size 
determines whether 
sectorization is needed  
 Height of the 
building (e.g. if building is 
too high beyond the reach 
of a ladder, then the use of 
an aerial appliance 
becomes necessary) 
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The excerpts below show some useful information regarding experts view on safety 
related cues:    
“If we open the door and the smoke was coming out and then suddenly starts to 
suck in- then we know the fire is waiting to get oxygen so we pull the door shut. 
You see what I mean- it’s a visual signs of what is happening in that building. 
And you get like pulsing- sometimes it sucks in and blow out, suck in and blow 
out- again that’s another dangerous sign” (Dickson, 23, Crew commander, UK) 
“We had to fight the fire from the rear [so as to block damages] because it was 
spreading towards the rear from the front …..also because the wall may fall 
upon any of the officers if we fight from the front” (Knight, 8, Watch 
commander, Nigeria)  
The officer in the first excerpt emphasized the importance of understanding the 
movement and behaviour of fire in a building. There could be misleading signals 
suggesting safe access into an engulfed building even when it is unsafe to do so. 
Hence, fire crews may end up endangering their lives by their failure to make sense 
of how these subtle safety cues evolve, exacerbated also by their inability to deploy 
standard entry control procedures. As an illustration, the officer provided examples of 
the possible occurrence of a “flashover” (the sudden and simultaneous ignition of 
substances in a room due to excessive high temperature) or a “backdraft” (smoke 
explosion that occurs when additional oxygen is introduced into a smouldering fire) in 
a building that is perhaps perceived to be safe. In essence, the absence of smoke or 
flame in a building does not necessarily guarantee safety or free access into the 
building. In the second excerpt, the officer explained the basis of his decision to fight 
the fire from the rear end of the building after assessing the direction of movement of 
the fire as well as spotting cracked walls.  
Hence, in contrast to other cue categories, safety cues present decision makers with 
important questions such as: how is this situation likely to affect members of the 
public? What hazards are present and how are they likely to affect the fire crews? Are 
the fire crews safe enough?  
(ii) Cues that indicate the “nature of problem”:  this category of cues comprises 
both visible and perceptual signals that help define the ‘criticality’ of an incident. Cues 
that belong to this category e.g. smoke colour, smoke texture and flame movement 
are often important as they provide useful information to officers and generally play a 
major role in determining what the most appropriate action plans would possibly be. 
With the aid of these cues officers are able to decide whether or not to request 
additional response resources and what those should be, as well as make sense of 
the type of substances burning (i.e. predict the class of fire involved). By virtue of their 
cue discrimination skills, experienced officers tend to understand the difference 
between the colour/texture of smoke oozing out from combustible substances (class 
B fire) and the ones generated from carbonaceous substances (class A fire).  
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The first excerpt below shows how one of the commanders used the size of fire and 
the intensity of its blaze to judge how severe an incident was, while the second 
illustrates how an expert used the extent of burn suffered by a victim to judge the 
victim’s chance of survival. 
 “Definitely you will see where the fire is coming from…. the wall will let you know 
which one the fire started with, you will see it. The room that the fire started with 
will be rigorously heated. Secondly is that you will see that the damage will be 
too much there” (Young, 8, Fire Supt. Officer, Nigeria) 
“The most important piece of information I need to know is what caused the 
burns, and the severity of the burns as well; and the only way you could do that 
is to go looking at him. You make your own mind up; anything above 30%, you 
are dead - six finger prints (Brown, 27, Crew commander, UK) 
By assessing the proceedings of events in a task environment, this category of cues 
helps officers gain better awareness of a seemingly complex situation. Thus, in 
contrast to safety cues which mostly aim to recommend what the most appropriate risk 
taking behaviour should be for officers, cues that indicate the nature of problem helps 
predict the severity of an incident, allowing the officers to become situationally aware 
of happenings in their environment. While the terms “situation assessment” and 
“situation awareness” are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature (Gore et 
al., 2006; Lipshitz et al., 2007; Klein, 2008), they are treated as separate but inter-
related concepts in this paper. The former deals with the aspects of “sizing up”, while 
the latter is mainly concerned with interpreting or “making sense” of the identified cues. 
  (iii) Environmental cues: this category of cues is mainly generated from external 
and environmental sources and include, for example, atmospheric temperature, wind 
speed, wind direction, humidity and topography. The most notable difference between 
environmental cues and other cue categories is that the former usually exceeds what 
incident commanders can easily influence or control. Operators are therefore required 
to possess extensive knowledge of the firefighting domain to be able to make sense 
of these cues and to understand their implications for task performance. In this study, 
experts emphasized the difficulty fire crews often encounter when carrying out 
firefighting tasks under unfavourable climatic conditions such as intense heat or 
extremely windy conditions (see excerpts below). Carrying out response activities in 
these conditions was also found to increase physical and mental fatigue amongst 
firefighters.  
The excerpts below show the possible ways through which environmental factors 
affect firefighting tasks from the point of view of the participants:  
“Because it was Harmattan season; you know there is Harmattan wind that use 
to blow early in the morning, so we had to back the wind, we cannot confront 
the wind as it was blowing towards us and affecting our firefighting operations” 
(Jack, 30, Chief fire superintendent, Nigeria)  
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“The location of the incident made it difficult to get water because the hydrant 
was far. I decided to use hose reel because it uses less water” (Isaac, 13.5, 
Crew commander, UK) 
It is worth mentioning that the term “environmental” does not only represent climatic 
conditions such as wind, temperature, humidity, but also includes external factors such 
as topography, water network, nature of incident scene e.g. availability of 
rivers/canals, location of hydrants etc. (see Table 4)   
(iv) Emotive cues: this category of cue mainly emanates from emotional and/or 
psychological behaviour displayed by or inferred from both victims and passersby. 
This is particularly so in incidents where the relevant cues required to develop 
response plans are not directly visible from the incident itself, or when there is need to 
draw additional information from people’s “body language”. Considering that these 
cues require making sense of people’s response to stimuli, incident commanders are 
expected to possess sound emotional intelligence in addition to having extensive 
technical knowledge of their work domain. In the current study, emotive cues 
(emotional outbursts, show of panic or restlessness) played an important role in 
influencing experts’ judgment and provided officers with actionable information even 
before arriving the scene of incident. The incident reports showed that experts 
sometimes leverage on their experience to draw important clues from the “voice tone” 
of a caller, from which an assessment of the severity of the incident is then made. In 
other instances, experts are also able to build a mental picture of the severity of an 
incident e.g. by observing the psychological behaviour of the crowd: 
“I knew we had a job as soon as we arrived the venue. The reason being that 
there was a crowd outside the building. If there were no one outside that 
building it could be doubtful, but when you see people as you are pulling up 
saying help! help!, that gives you a great indication that something is going on” 
(Brown, 27, Crew Commander, UK) 
Despite the relevance of emotive cues in this regards, some of the participants warned 
against being unnecessarily reactive to mere emotional outbursts. The interview 
excerpt below supports existing claims (e.g. Slovic, 1993; Kahneman and Klein, 2009) 
that laymen (i.e. untrained firefighters) are often more emotional than domain experts 
and therefore more prone to subjective judgment:  
 “Sometimes the crowd make it look more serious than it is through the way 
they scream, shout or react to smoke or small fires” (Mike, 28, Assistant Chief 
Fire Supt, Nigeria) 
The ability to differentiate between emotive cues and mere false signals, however 
subtly, is therefore key to fireground decision making. As shown in our previous study 
(Okoli et al., 2016a), expertise lies in knowing which emotive cue is worth paying 
attention to and which is not.  
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v) Incident command and control cues: this category of cues, which was 
predominantly reported by the UK experts, often informs the need for a takeover 
decision. These cues help identify if/when it is best for a superior officer to take over 
command responsibility from a lesser ranked operator. There are two dimensions to 
the way these cues are applied as far as fireground decision making is concerned: 
firstly, knowing when a superior officer ought to take over from a lesser ranked officer 
and secondly, knowing when to allow a lesser ranked officer carry on with overall 
incident command responsibility. Whilst it is typical in the UK for the most experienced 
officers (in terms of length of service) to take over leadership position upon arriving at 
fire scenes, there are few instances where lesser ranked officers are handed overall 
command and control responsibility. In more recent times, the rule of thumb is to allow 
the officer that has gained the best situation awareness of an incident to take charge, 
regardless of rank. The interview excerpts below showed instances where a superior 
officer had to take over command and control responsibility as a matter of urgency:  
“I walked down looked for the officer in charge, the incident commander, at the 
same time I saw these guys trying to mobilize a firefighting jet in between this 
house and the next door neighbor’s house on an alleyway to try and take it 
round the back to fight the fire from the back because that’s where the main 
seat of the fire was. Now I haven’t taken over, I haven’t even seen the incident 
commander at that point but I intervened at that point because I know No we 
won’t do that” (Troy, 27, Area commander, UK) 
“So my first decision was about when I’m I taking over. I know I have got a 
significant incident on my hands, I have to take over, I’m obliged to when it gets 
to 5 pumps” (Darren, 17, District commander, UK) 
In the first excerpt, a superior officer, an area commander, had to takeover command 
and control responsibility from a watch commander after spotting some potentially 
wrong tactics being deployed by the firefighters. The officer reported he had to step in 
immediately to rectify the action plans without having to go through any formal hand-
over procedure. In the second excerpt, as with the first, another superior officer, a 
district commander reportedly took over from a watch commander after perceiving that 
the fire was getting out of control. Understanding the cues that engendered these 
takeover decisions is therefore perceived as crucial for the purpose of training potential 
incident commanders.  
4.0. DISCUSSION 
The study set out to identify and categorize various cues utilized by experienced 
fireground commanders in the UK and Nigeria, with respect to a retrospective incident 
reported by each expert. While we acknowledge that the list of cues presented in Table 
4 is not exhaustive, we also note that the total number of elicited cues seem quite 
encouraging in relation to other cue elicitation studies (Calderwood, Crandall and 
Baynes, 1990; Wong, 2004; Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003; Perry and Wiggins, 2008), 
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outnumbering even those identified by Klein and his colleague in their seminal work 
with urban firefighters (Klein et al., 1986).  
The interview reports reveal that identifying cues is not necessarily a challenging task 
on its own, particularly when relevant training has been acquired. The more 
challenging cognitive task actually lies in understanding the implications of the 
identified cues and being able to prioritize actions amidst rapidly evolving conditions. 
We argue that the ability to make sense of any cue firstly requires building a strong 
knowledge base about the firefighting domain. This includes understanding the 
dynamics of fire, smoke movement patterns, chemistry of combustion and fire 
behaviour ─ all of which appear to be built and refined through experience. Previous 
NDM studies across domains such as sports, medicine and midwifery, education, 
aviation, military, ambulance and firefighting have shown a positive relationship 
between actors’ years of experience and their ability to recognize and interpret cues 
(Wong, 2000; Baylor, 2001; Falzer, 2004; McLennan et al., 2006; Fessey, 2002; 
Dreyfus, 2004; Tissington and Flin, 2005; Kermarrec and Bossard, 2014).  
Thematic analyses of the interview excerpts suggest the existence of a positive link 
between identified cues, prior experiential knowledge about a task domain and 
subsequent response plans. The cues identified on the fireground must first generate 
useful information to experienced officers, which they must then process, interpret and 
translate into useful actions (see excerpts shown on Table 3). In the cues that indicate 
the nature of a problem, for example, an association was found between identified 
cues (e.g. the size of a fire) and subsequent response plans (e.g. deploying specialist 
appliance). In safety cues, reports show that spotting a cracked wall in a well alight 
building mostly suggests the need to prioritize fire crew safety, with the possibility of 
initiating defensive as opposed to offensive tactics. In environmental cues, experts 
revealed that carrying out a response effort in extremely windy and non-windy 
conditions could both be counter-productive. The former condition was reported to 
increase both the chance of injury to firefighters and the likelihood of fire spreading to 
surrounding properties, while the latter would most likely dense-up smoke, thereby 
creating communication difficulties amongst crew members.  
The accuracy of the interpretations an officer provides regarding a cue is contingent 
upon the strength of the patterns that have been chunked in their memory. Even when 
an incident presents visible cues, the onus still lies on the officer to make sense of 
such cues using their experience. The above assertion gives credence to prior 
research suggesting that the length of active service and the quality of experience 
gained are both crucial to building a repertoire of patterns, or what Chase and Simon 
(1973) and Gobet (2005) called chunks and templates respectively. In their early study 
with chess players, Chase and Simon (1973) hypothesized that experts can rapidly 
recognize key features of a problem using their perceptual and cue discriminating 
skills. The authors further tested this hypothesis through an experiment that involved 
expert and novice chess players, which subsequently led to the development of the 
‘chunking’ theory (Chase and Simon, 1973). The chunking theory is based on the 
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notion that experts are often able to store a large amount of information in their long 
term memory, usually as a single entity, which they rely upon to direct their future 
course of action (Gobet, 2005). In two different tasks presented to the two groups of 
chess players (chess masters and novices), the authors found that the former were 
able to memorize and reconstruct a chess position better than the weaker novice 
players. Simon and Chase (1973) linked such exceptional performances to the larger 
amount of chunks the chess masters had acquired compared to their novice 
counterparts.  
The current study also showed that the way experts generally sought and utilized 
emotive cues seemed to contradict the claims made by some cognitive theorists 
(Easterbrook, 1959; Epstein, 1994; Shapiro and Spence, 1997; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2005). The cue-utilization theory (Easterbrook, 1959), for example, 
suggests that consistently arousing the emotions of task performing individuals 
through an external stimulus would likely reduce the number of cues they are able to 
identify, and in turn affect task performance negatively. The theory further suggests 
that the more people are exposed to the cues that arouse their emotion the more likely 
they are to be distracted away from the main tasks to be performed. Unfortunately, 
there was little or no evidence from this study to support Easterbrook’s theory as none 
of the interview transcripts seemed to support the claim that experts were distracted 
from identifying cues. This also holds true for the twelve “emotional” incidents that 
involved loss of lives and massive loss of properties (UK= 5, Nigeria=7). We instead 
support the notion that experienced commanders are able to cope with multiple 
information sources by filtering out what they perceive to be irrelevant information or 
noise (see Okoli et al., 2016 for details). By so doing, the short term memory is 
preserved from information overload, thereby ensuring that officers are not distracted 
away from the main firefighting tasks.  
Previous studies have shown that competence in task performance is not always a 
function of the decision maker’s cognitive capability, but more on the “structure” of the 
task environment (Calderwood, Crandall and Baynes, 1990; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010). The word structure in this 
context represents the extent to which informational cues are present in the 
environment as well as the ease of identifying them. Kahneman and Klein (2009) used 
the term zero-validity to describe environments where identifying cues often proves 
difficult, or where the cues identified mostly fail to correlate with subsequent response 
action. It can therefore be argued that one of the most important concerns for 
fireground decision makers is whether or not a task environment provided adequate 
informational cues upon which decisions are to be based. The above interview 
excerpts (see also Table 3) suggest that fireground commanders often rely on cues to 
develop workable action plans, although it would have been more interesting to 
investigate the effect that lack of experts’ reliance on cues would have also had on 
task performance.   
17 
 
The classes of cues presented in this paper are aimed at improving existing training 
protocols for potential incident commanders. A wide range of training scenarios 
(learning tasks) could be designed using one or more cue lists provided in Table 4, 
where facilitators could aim to improve learners’ understanding on how various cue 
categories might likely affect task performance under varying task constraints. 
Developed learning tasks could also be used to identify additional training needs that 
learners might benefit from e.g. providing additional emotional intelligence training to 
the less experienced officers so as to develop their problem solving and perceptual 
skills. Such training could subsequently facilitate learners’ cognitive schemata until 
they are able to differentiate between emotive cues worth attending to and those that 
are mere false alarm. Specifically this study supports existing research suggesting that 
expertise in the firefighting domain is more about leveraging upon one’s experience to 
differentiate between cues that are needed for task performance and those that are 
mere distractions.        
5.0. CONCLUSION  
This study set out to outline the cues sought by experienced firefighters using the 
critical decision method (CDM) as knowledge elicitation tool. The importance of cue 
elicitation cannot be overemphasized in a complex domain such as firefighting as it 
plays a crucial role in the design of training curricula. It therefore holds true that if the 
cues experts utilized in formulating their action plans are known, a decision support 
system that has the potential to aid decision-making amidst various task constraints 
could subsequently be developed.  
The insights generated in this study have some implications for training. For instance, 
we recommend that individuals with less experience are first encouraged to enrich 
their mental models, build sufficient patterns and gain more real life experiences 
before any meaningful assessment of their cue discriminating skills is attempted. Since 
the elicited cues from this study were direct outputs of real-life incidents as opposed 
to contrived tasks, it is hoped that the efficiency of cue-based knowledge transfer from 
experts to novices would be enhanced through the development of appropriate 
learning tasks that are tailored towards the naturalistic environment. Future research 
is ongoing and focused on developing ‘learning tasks’ from the elicited cues for novice 
firefighters as part of their training curricula.  
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